Not Even Trying is een snoeiharde maar gegronde kritiek op de moderne "wetenschap".

  • Wat lag aan de basis van de opmars van de wetenschap?
    The take-off of science therefore depended on two main things: 1. a sufficient concentration of creative genius focused on scientific problems plus 2. a modest degree of cognitive specialization.
  • De start was dus bijzonder acceptabel. Waar begon het mis te lopen?
    More importantly, professional science initially recruited only those who regarded the pursuit of truth as an iron law (and dishonesty was punished by expulsion from science). Yet, due to professionalization, science increasingly attracted careerists rather than truth-seekers.
  • De "professionalisering" van de wetenschap is dus een belangrijke oorzaak:
    (Truth-seekers are typically resistant to bureaucratic organization; and bureaucratic organization is intrinsically hostile to truth-seekers.) The professionalization of science having eliminated those who were internally motivated to seek truth; various formal mechanisms and procedures were introduced to try and deal with purely careerist motivations. These mostly amount to peer review mechanisms (peer review = the opinion of a group of senior colleagues). So, instead of truth-seeking, a filter of committee evaluations was applied to ever-moreblatantly- careerist individual behaviour.
  • Dus professionisering en "peer review" verdreef de waarheidszoekers en verving ze door carrièrezoekers.
    And science continued to grow - recruiting less- and less-talented, weaker- and weaker-motivated, less- and - less honest personnel until... ... until untalented, unmotivated and dishonest career-orientated professional scientists became a large majority within science and included most of the most successful researchers; thus careerists took-over the peer review evaluation procedures such as to impose their values; and ‘science’ became nothing but a ‘professional research bureaucracy’.
  • Wetenschap is dus niet langer het toepassen van de wetenschappelijke methode maar een bureaucratie, een middel om een goedbetaalde carrière te maken. Waarheid werd onwaarheid:
    The most egregious domain of untruthfulness is probably where scientists speak or write about their own work. When modern researchers are preparing applications for funding, there is clearly no notion that they should be trying to communicate the truth. The idea would be regarded as ridiculous! The whole motive and rationale of the exercise is to write a successful application: in other words to get yourself money by selling (what you claim are) your research results and plans. The veracity of what is being claimed is merely a means to an end. The funder neither expects truth nor does the applicant expect to write truth – grantsmanship is thus a kind of game (albeit with high stakes) where one side sets up the rules, and the other side tries to be as dishonest as it can get away with, while sticking to the letter of the rules - then the first side tries to catch them out in an inconsistency.
  • Charlton maakt zelfs de vergelijking met georganiseerde misdaad:
    Modern research grant proposals therefore resemble the official accounts of organized crime – everyone knows that they are intentionally and carefully faked, but the auditors are allowed only to check for internal consistency among the lies. Consistent lying is fine – indeed admired and rewarded. So long as the information in grant proposals and research publications has been thoroughly laundered, then everybody is happy (well, ‘everybody’ who has influence over career success – and for modern researchers that is everybody-who-matters...).
    In sum, when a modern researcher says ‘my research is progress towards curing cancer’ it really means ‘it is not impossible that my research could conceivably count as progress towards curing cancer’.
  • Het probleem met peer review:
    Yet peer review is no more, no less, than the opinion of senior scientists. And not individual judgment, but a procedure for gathering opinions of a group, followed by some kind of more-orless formal, more-or-less explicit procedure for deriving a single decision from the group of opinions: by vote, by veto, by some kind of weighted quantification, by an impressionistic judgment of the decision, or whatever.
    In practice, most peer review is a ‘black box’ mechanism – and all the more effective for its unknown operations. A question is fed into the black box of peer review, some senior scientists deliberate in some way and some answer emerges – an answer that is impossible to critique yet regarded as authoritative (as if a committee of senior scientists constituted a kind of super-multibrain with magically-combined wisdom and expertise!) The essence of peer review is therefore the ‘peers’ – which implicitly means a plurality of senior figures from (broadly) the same domain or field of research endeavour; and the ‘review’ element which in some way derives a bimodal or categorical evaluation from the plurality of opinions.
    To put it another way, the triumph of peer review is a triumph of the committee over the individual, of procedure over judgment, of the selective and explicit over the unbounded and implicit. The even-more-significant aspect of peer review is the rhetorical success of implying that a committee procedure is more objective and more valid than individual judgment; the almost-wholly successful trick of disguising that peer review is pure opinion, and therefore just as ‘unreliable’ and prone to corruption as individual judgment – but that in fact peer review is worse than individual judgment for the same reason that a committee decision is intrinsically worse than an individual decision: because the committee decision is removed from individual responsibility, hence removed from responsibility altogether. (Responsibility is an attribute of individual authority. Without I.A. there is no responsibility – merely a legal contract.) Yet peer review is neither necessary nor sufficient as a definition of science, it is orthogonal to science; and therefore domination by peer review marks the disappearance of ‘real science’ and the inclusion of its activities within the system of large, complex transnational bureaucracies.
    And peer review processes are set-up and manned by senior scientists. In a sense, peer review (where it matters, where it makes a difference to policy and practice) simply is monopolization of all evaluation, reward or punishment processes by senior scientists; yet not as autonomous individuals but as components of a process which nobody-in-particular controls.
    Peer review is not necessary, nor was peer review a feature of science in its golden age, when science worked best – most effectively and efficiently. Old writings never mention anything like modern peer review. In those eras decision making was mostly, sometimes wholly, individual and personal (with certain exceptions where a ‘collegial’ method of decision making was used to allocate goods that were generated and controlled by an institution).
    And peer review is not distinctive to science, but is indeed (very obviously – I would have thought) found in all academic subjects nowadays; and is characteristic of many formal bureaucracies. Indeed, peer review is perhaps the defining feature, the hallmark of modern bureaucracies in which personal responsibility has been replaced by (deliberately, not accidentally) unaccountable committee procedures
  • "moderne" wetenschap, de bureaucratie die waarheidsvinding heeft vervangen:
    But whatever the origin of the pressures to corrupt science, it is obvious that the scientific leadership have themselves been corrupted and co-opted. The alternative would have been inflexible resistance on a matter of principle – the principle of truth-seeking and truth-speaking as an Iron Law intrinsic to science, even to the point of ‘martyrdom’. Notable individuals from past generations of scientists did indeed stand up for their beliefs to the extent of being sacked, imprisoned, exiled or even killed. We moderns can only stand in awe of such principled behaviour. But modern ‘scientists’ have been kept in-line without any need for recourse to such draconian measures. The mildest of implied threats have been enough to convert real scientists into careerist drones.
    Modern ‘scientists’ are not interested in whether something really is true; they are interested only in whether peer review says it is true – they are interested only in whether something is fashionable, funded, publishable in high-impact fora, and likely to attract jobs, promotions and prizes.
  • Wetenschap is efficiency-gedreven ipv. waarheidsgedreven:
    The experiment in exclusion of truth talk was driven (presumably) partly by the desire for greater efficiency (the desire for less metaphysical chit-chat and more hard science) – and partly on the belief that transcendental values serve no practical function – merely waste time and energy, confuse and mislead. The assumption was that science could more-efficiently be done using just internal, professional (within-science) evaluations.
  • De materialistische assumptie aan de basis van de moderne wetenschap is ook verantwoordelijk voor de zorgelijke situatie in de wetenschap:
    Partly it was also driven by the increasing prevalence of materialist atheism – such that ‘scientists’ no longer believe in transcendental reality; indeed some modern ‘scientists’ seem not to believe that there is any reality separate from social structures that describe and define what-counts-as-truth. They seem to operate on the basis that reality is ‘socially constructed’.
    The discussion then moves beyond science, and to the presuppositions of science; moves to a level of the basic understanding of things – in other words, to metaphysics. Early scientists generally assumed (I mean they assumed at a metaphysical level – as their conception of the nature of reality) that the truth was reality - a property of the universe created by a god. Truth (knowledge of reality) was communicated in outline to humans partly by being in-built (by god) as human nature and partly from divine revelation; truth was understood by means of reason (which was valid because also god-given), and applied to the study of Nature by god-given human ingenuity. Early scientists therefore believed in both god/s and truth. Later scientists (from the late 19th century into the early 20th century) were atheists about god but realists about truth. For example Albert Einstein had an abstract, or pantheistic view of an ordered universe and a belief in the fortunate (but not god-given) rational and intuitive ability of humans to understand the nature of reality.
    Another generation or two onwards, and most of the best scientists were atheists about god and also did not believe in the reality of truth. They disbelieved in both God and truth, nonetheless the best scientists continued to behave as if they did regard truth as real. For example Richard Feynman was not religious and seemingly did not believe in transcendental truth but anyway lived and worked by a strict personal ethic of truthfulness and truth-seeking. Modern scientists have abandoned all this as so much useless baggage. They are atheists about god, relativists about truth, and careerists in their behaviour: they neither believe, nor behave as if they believe, in transcendental truth.
    For scientists, the crucial matter is that each real scientist must, must, must (for whatever reason) work according to a binding personal ethic of the importance and reality of transcendental truth – that truth lies beyond and above science; and science must be practiced according to this reality.
    Francis Crick commented that you should research that about which you gossip, James Watson commented that you should avoid subjects which bore you. Their point was that science is so difficult, that when motivation is deficient then problems will not get solved. You need, you must have, spontaneous positive interest (the gossip test) and you cannot solve problems that bore you because real science is too hard to succeed without the benefit of spontaneous interest.
  • Wat is een echte wetenschapper? Om te beginnen moet hij geloven dat realiteit reëel is en bestaat:
    A real scientist needs to want to understand reality - this necessarily entails first believing in reality (believing that reality is real), and secondly believing that one ought to discover and describe reality (which is the specific vocation of a scientist).
    The belief in reality is a necessary metaphysical belief, which cannot be denied without contradiction - nonetheless, in modern ruling elite culture it is frequently denied (this is called nihilism); which is why modern elite culture is unprecedented in being irrational, self-contradictory and self-destroying.
  • Een echte wetenschapper kan geel deel uitemaken van de heersende elite, maar moet "machteloos" zijn (het omgekeerde is tegenwoordig het geval natuurlijk):
    But obviously, a real scientist cannot be a nihilist - whatever cynical or trendy things he might say or do in public, in his heart he must have a transcendental belief in the reality of reality and must want to know something of it. Thus a real scientist cannot be a member of the modern ruling elite – therefore, a real scientist in the modern world must be powerless...
  • Een echte wetenschapper gelooft dat de natuur zijn geheimen kan prijsgeven:
    Science also involves the metaphysical belief (‘metaphysical’ meaning a necessary assumption which frames the practice of science, and is not itself part of science) – a belief in the understandability of nature including the human desire and capacity to understand. (That is, understandability at some level of approximation, sufficient understanding - but not necessary detailed or comprehensive understanding.). Without this belief in the understandability of nature, science becomes an absurd and impossible attempt to find the one truth among an infinite number of possible errors.
    Nonetheless, in modern elite culture, a belief in the understandability of nature and human capacity is routinely denied - another aspect of nihilism. Among many other consequences, this denial destroys the science which makes possible modern elite culture.
  • De wetenschappelijke bureaucratie doodt de menselijke geest:
    It was around the 1970s that the human spirit began to be overwhelmed by bureaucracy (although the trend had been growing for many decades).
  • De wetenschappelijke vooruitgang is dan ook tandende en gaat in sommige gevallen zelfs achteruit:
    Since the mid-1970s the rate of progress has declined in physics, biology and the medical sciences – and some of these have gone into reverse, so that the practice of science in some areas has overall gone backwards, valid knowledge has been lost and replaced with phony fashionable triviality and dishonest hype.
    Some of the biggest areas of science – medical research, molecular biology, neuroscience, epidemiology, climate research – are almost wholly trivial or bogus. They have failed to deliver on a truly catastrophic scale.
    The fact is that human no longer do - can no longer do - many things we used to be able to do: land on the moon, swiftly win wars against weak opposition and then control the defeated nation, secure national borders, discover ‘breakthrough’ medical treatments, prevent crime, design and build to a tight deadline, educate people so they are ready to work before the age of 22, suppress piracy on the high seas...
    Also noteworthy is that the deepest manned ocean descent of about 10.9 kilometres into the Mariana Trench, was as long ago as 1960; and humans have never again been as deep during the past half century. Humans have failed to prevent or suppress the re-emergence of high seas piracy on a large scale because we nowadays cannot do it - although humans solved the problem 150 years ago. And we cannot solve new problems either, since these require a combination of attitudes and freedoms that we can no longer imagine, or which we fear more than the problems themselves. In the past the average experts were both smarter and more creative than we are now, and these experts would then have been in a position to do the needful.
    Personally, I am no fan of Big Science, indeed I regard the success of the Manhattan Project as the beginning of the end for real science. But those who are keen that humanity solve big problems and who boast about our ability to do so; need to acknowledge that humanity has apparently become much worse, not better, at solving big problems over the past 40 years – so long as we judge success only in terms of solving imposed problems which we do not already know how to solve, and so long as we ignore the trickery of the many Texas Sharpshooters among modern scientists and engineers.
  • De achteruitgang van de wetenschap betekent het instorten van de "moderniteit":
    Of course a scientist feels that the real importance of Classics was trivial compared with Science – that the modern world depends on Science. Quite true; but then the ancient world depended on Classics, and the collapse of Classics was linked with the collapse of traditional society. The collapse of Science is linked with the collapse of modernity -both as cause and as consequence.
  • Klassieke vs. moderne wetenschap:
    In terms of the classical theory of science; worthless theories (e.g. theories that are incoherent or fail to predict observations) should be demolished by sceptical (or jealous) competitor scientists, who will denounce the weaknesses of merely-fashionable theories in person, in conferences and (especially) in print – in the scientific record, the ‘literature’. However, in practice it seems that even the most conclusive ‘hatchet jobs’ done on phoney theories will fail to kill, or even weaken, them - when the phoney theories are backed-up with sufficient career incentives. Scientists gravitate to where the money is; and the paraphernalia of specialist conferences (to present results at), journals (to publish in) and academic jobs (to work in) will follow the money as night follows day; so long as the funding stream is sufficiently strong, deep and sustained.
    The problem with science is a problem of validity. Real science had robust (although not infallible) ways of establishing validity; modern professional research cannot establish validity, because it does not recognise any transcendent reality beyond the opinion of ‘scientists’. To be more exact, modern professional research has methods which are regarded as intrinsically providing validation – but the methods are themselves unvalidated – indeed the methods used to assert validity are no more than arbitrary conventions enforced by power.
    And, indeed, that there are serious weaknesses about the conceptualization of science as mostly a matter of testing predictions – since this process turns out to be circular – once validation is merely a matter of peer review, of consensus.
    And, indeed, that there are serious weaknesses about the conceptualization of science as mostly a matter of testing predictions – since this process turns out to be circular – once validation is merely a matter of peer review, of consensus.
  • Wetenschap is zuiver opinie geworden, dit komt het meest duidelijk tot uiting in "wetenschappelijke" fact checks waarbij men gewoon de mening van zelfgekozen "academici" plaatst tegenover de critici en daarbij automatisch aanneemt dat wat die zelfgekozen carrièristen zeggen de waarheid is:
    This means peer review = a poll of opinions = government by committees (some actual committees, meeting in a room; some merely virtual committees with participants distributed across time and space). Therefore the validation process is made consensual, and disconnected from any notion of testing putative knowledge in relation to reality.
  • Een wetenschappelijke theorie moet om te beginnen coherent zijn (is zelden het geval: bekendste voorbeeld is de virologie, misschien wel de meest incoherente theorie ooit):
    There can be no ‘testing’ without coherence. Without coherence there is, indeed, nothing to test. Incoherent theories do not have tightly-defined implications and cannot make precise predictions, therefore there is no conceivable way in which they could be put to a test. So... incoherent theories cannot be tested, and most theories in modern research are incoherent (in so far as they are even articulated – there are branches of science operating under the delusion that they do not have any theory), and modern careerist pseudo-science is powerfully resistant to any attempt to create coherence. 
    When theories are incoherent, hence un-testable, therefore false science can never be refuted. The process of (supposedly) ‘testing’ is one that never ends; nothing can ever be put to a conclusive test, therefore nothing is ever conclusively refuted. Incoherent ‘science’ is not even false. Therefore incoherent science can be kept going ad infinitum – whether it is true or not. From a careerist perspective, therefore, the incoherence of science may be a feature, not a bug.
    In sum science is a child of philosophy, and as in philosophy, the basic ‘test’ of science is coherence.
  • Coherentie, vervolg:
    To put it another way: It is an axiom that all true scientific statements are consistent with all other true scientific statements. True statements should not contradict one another, they should cohere. In order that coherence not be vacuous, statements must be sufficiently precise in their implications (implications being another word for ‘predictions’). So that when it is discovered that there is no logical coherence between two scientific propositions (two theories, 'facts' or whatever), and assuming the reasoning process is sound, then one or both propositions must be wrong.
  • Wat is echte wetenschap?
    Real scientific work is the process of making and learning about propositions. A newly made proposition that is not coherent with a bunch of previously existing propositions may nonetheless be true, because all or some of the previously existing propositions may be false. Indeed that is one meaning of a scientific revolution – a revolution is what happens when a new proposition succeeds in overturning a bunch of old coherent propositions, and establishing a new network of coherent propositions: a different set of propositions, coherent on a different basis. This is always a work in progress, and at any moment there is considerable incoherence in science which is being sorted-out – or, at least, that is the usual assumption.
    The fatal flaw in modern science is that there is no such sorting-out. Incoherence is ignored, propositions are merely piled loosely together and the result is called a theory. Or the revelation of incoherence is eluded, rather than sorted-out, by the process of micro-specialization and the creation of isolated little worlds within-which there may be coherence, but between-which there is zero coherence (and no attempt to check or impose coherence).
    Indeed, some philosophies of science have evolved to rationalize the endless deferral of checking for cohesion between specialisms; and there is a big literature in the philosophy of science which purports to prove that different types of science are incommensurable, incomparable, and independent – hence cannot meaningfully be checked against one another. This implies that there is no unit of scientific validity greater than the micro-specialty. This implies that each micro-specialty (with its narrow selection of foundational assumptions and methods stands alone. This implies that there is no such thing as ‘Science’ and that the individual scientific specialty is the largest possible unit of coherence.
  • Moderne wetenschap is te gespecialiseerd en een loutere opeenhoping van micro-specialistaties zonder connectie met de waarheid en de realiteit:
    In other words, there are only the hundreds of microspecialist ‘sciences’ that cast no light on one another, are irrelevant to each other, do not constrain each other. This means in turn that all the different micro-specialties that now constitute ‘science’ would not be contributing to anything greater than themselves considered individually. This means that, formally speaking, there is no such thing as Science only hundreds of ‘sciences’– ‘Science’ is merely an arbitrary collection, a loose heap of micro-specialties each yielding autonomous micro-knowledge of unknowable applicability, and the whole given the honorific title of ‘Science’.
    This is very obviously true of modern medical science and biology. For example the massive specialism of ‘neuroscience’ does not add-up to anything like ‘understanding’ of the brain or nervous system – it is merely a collection of hundreds of autonomous micro-specialties and factoids about nervous tissue. Observations of this, then of that, then of something else – pile ‘em high and call it neuroscience!
    These micro-specialties were not checked for consistency with each other at any point, and as a consequence they are not consistent with each other. Neuroscience was not conducted with an aim of creating a coherent body of knowledge, and as a result it is not a coherent body of knowledge.
    ‘Neuroscience’, as a term (it is not a concept, does not rise anywhere close to being a concept) is merely an excuse for funding a vast heap of mutual irrelevance.
    Real science is first coherent, then its coherence is deliberately checked – sometimes (not always) by testing. But modern research is incoherent, and therefore whatever masquerades as checking and testing is not merely irrelevant but actively misleading – merely an excuse for unendingly funding permanently inconclusive research.

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