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The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I

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2018**10 Highlight(s) | 0 Note(s)**

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For all its limitations this table bears out in graphic form a set of relationships that should be obvious to any student of recent Third World history. For most of the sample countries, U.S.-controlled aid has been positively related to investment climate and inversely related to the maintenance of a democratic order and human rights. Only in the case of South Korea and Thailand is the pattern reversed. The South Korean exception we have explained above. The row for Thailand shows a

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CIA destabilization operations have assumed many forms, of which only a few will be mentioned briefly here. First is the outright murder of political leaders like Lumumba (to be replaced by the more amenable Mobutu), or General Schneider in Chile,²¹ and the numerous attempts on the life of Castro.²² Second, and also familiar, are the direct conspiracies with terrorists, mercenaries or (usually) military factions within a country to disrupt or overthrow a government in disfavor. Among the more conspicuous and acknowledged successes with heavy CIA involvement have been the Belgian Congo, Chile, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran; among the failures, the abortive 1958 rebellion in Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961. In the case of Laos, the CIA actually organized and directed a mercenary army of hill tribesmen in an effort to destroy the indigenous social revolution, cynically abandoning its protégés when they were largely decimated and no longer needed.²³ In this general category, we may also note such activities as terrorist

attacks, crop-poisoning, etc., as practiced extensively by the CIA under Kennedy and subsequent administrations in an effort to undermine the Cuban regime and disrupt Cuban economic development.²⁴ The total number of cases of CIA involvement in active subversion of established governments (and attempts at political murder) runs into the hundreds or even thousands. Third is political bribery and the funding of foreign politicians. In the case of Brazil, the inflow of CIA money in the pre-1964 period was so huge, involving so many hundreds of politicians, that it provoked a scandal and a government investigation, which was conveniently terminated by the 1964 coup. Fourth is propaganda, which can take a wide

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variety of forms, but is invariably undercover (and thus dishonest as to its source) and is often carried out by subsidies to researchers, research institutes, publishers, and journalists. It can be massive in scale and scope, as in pre-coup Brazil, where in 1962 the CIA mounted a "saturation campaign," with 80 weekly radio programs, 300 additional hours of radio-TV advertising, a flooding of the press with canned editorials and "information," large quantities of billboard ads and pamphlets, etc. It kept "dozens" of journalists on its payroll and edited a monthly magazine, using top quality paper and free distribution. It even rented the editorial page of Rio's evening paper, *A Noite*. And it subsidized the publication of numerous conservative books, "distributed

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A fifth type of CIA destabilization operation is the organization and funding of demonstrations, important in the subversion process in both Brazil and Chile. Philip Agee noted in his

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A sixth CIA tactic is the infiltration of unfavored organizations and political parties. This has informational value and it allows confusion to be sown and agent provocateurs to function. In Brazil, the most

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Finally, the CIA collects information, which is used in various ways. Most interesting is the extent to which it regularly provides information to rightist thugs and conspirators against constitutional government.

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A revolt of the Bengals of East Pakistan against the rule of the dominant Moslems of West Pakistan in the early 1970s led to a large-scale military effort at suppression by the West Pakistanis that quickly degenerated into a huge rape and slaughter. This terrible carnage was given considerable publicity in the West and a small segment of the U.S. public became aroused and active in opposition to U.S. policy in this area. This resulted in part from the sheer magnitude of the onslaught, which one authority described as "the most massive calculated savagery that has been visited on a civil population in recent times."

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For the Nixon administration, nevertheless, this was a "benign" bloodbath, and its scope and brutality failed to deter Washington from continuing military and economic aid to the government engaging in the slaughter. This was a bloodbath imposed by a friendly military elite with which U.S. authorities had a traditional affinity—"notorious in Mr. Nixon's case" as Max Frankel pointed out⁴⁶—and U.S. policy "tilted" toward Pakistan just enough to maintain the friendly relationship with the ruling junta required by U.S. strategic planning for the Persian Gulf and South Asia.⁴⁷ Consequently the matter was regarded as "purely internal"⁴⁸ to Pakistan, the bloodbath was benign, and Washington was "not nearly so exercised about Pakistani suppression of the East Bengalis as about what they saw as Indian aggression against Pakistan."

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The Prime Minister of Belgium advised his cabinet as early as May, 1972 that Burundi was the scene of "veritable genocide," and in June

the term “genocide” began to appear in State Department internal memos and cables. Yet after a small news flurry in June, and speeches on the subject by Senators Kennedy and Tunney, the U.S. press and Congress lapsed into virtual silence.⁵² In confirming a new ambassador to Burundi in June, 1972, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee showed itself to be not only uninformed on the history and recent events in that country, but also quite unconcerned with the massacre.⁵³

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The basic government line, throughout, is as expressed by Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, discussing a forthcoming Asian tour in Washington with Australian correspondents. Asked about reported atrocities in East Timor, he said: I want to stress I am not remotely interested in getting involved in an argument over the actual number of people killed. People were killed and that is always a tragedy but what is at issue is the actual situation in Timor today...

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