



kindle

**The Pentagon's Wars: The Military's Undeclared War Against America's Presidents**

van Perry, Mark

Gratis Kindle Instant Preview: <https://read.amazon.com/kp/kshare?asin=B072L645F6>

### Aantekeningen (5)

- 5 Markeringen | Geel (5)

---

## CHAPTER FOUR Hugh Shelton: Clinton's General

---

### Pagina 101 | Markeren (Geel)

generals and admirals weighed in on the campaign. Retired US Army lieutenant general Robert Gard was among the most outspoken of the dozens of officers who condemned the campaign as “one of the most immoral wars this country has ever fought.” Gard and his peers were joined in their judgment by veteran US diplomats who condemned the Rambouillet Agreement as purposely written in order to ensure Milosevic would reject it. One of its key requirements was that the Serb leader accept NATO troop access to his country, a demand its drafters knew he would never accept. Even former secretary of state Henry Kissinger was shocked, saying Rambouillet was “an excuse to start bombing.” The joint chiefs agreed: Operation Allied Force was not a war of necessity, it was a war of choice. The intervention's critics point out that Allied Force was being waged without the backing of a UN resolution, because Russia and China opposed it, with the United States acting as “the KLA's Air Force.” Clark's predecessor, George Joulwan, watched all of this from afar and summarized the Pentagon's views. “Allied Force was cooked up by Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger,” he said. “Most senior military leaders were dead set against it.”<sup>30</sup> Pentagon reporters called Operation Allied Force “Madeleine's War,” and circulated details of an off-the-record conversation the secretary had had with a reporter. The Rambouillet Agreement, she'd told the journalist, “intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that's what they're going to get.” But while reporters called Allied Force “Madeleine's War,” the military concluded it was “Wes Clark's War.” Richard Holbrooke agreed. He'd done everything he could to stop the NATO bombing campaign, running headlong into Milosevic's stubbornness and Wes Clark's view of the world. “Kosovo was simply an extension of Bosnia in the mind of Wesley Clark,” he later observed. “For Clark, Kosovo was the logical next step in his liberal interventionist attitude toward the use of force. That's why they put him there.”<sup>31</sup> The Kosovo bombing reinforced the JCS's animus

13 mrt. 2022

### Pagina 109 | Markeren (Geel)

Other senior officers went further. The problem with the war was not that it was fought poorly, but that it was fought at all. Claiming victory was putting lipstick on a pig. There was no such thing as a “humanitarian war.” Allied Force had empowered thugs, thieves, and drug dealers. The KLA was not a liberation movement, but a gang. This was “Madeleine's War,” proof that liberals and draft dodgers could be as tough as Republicans. Albright reversed hundreds of years of foreign policy thinking: it used to be that you bombed

when diplomacy failed, now you bombed in order to make diplomacy succeed. “Up until the start of the conflict,” she’d said, “the military served to back up our diplomacy. Now, our diplomacy serves to back up our military.” It was a dangerous precedent.<sup>41</sup> The war also bared the inherent tensions in

13 mrt. 2022

## **CHAPTER FIVE Tommy Franks: Rumsfeld’s General**

---

### **Pagina 125 | Markeren (Geel)**

HUGH SHELTON WAS in the air over the Atlantic Ocean, headed to a NATO conference in Hungary, when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The JCS chairman, who had a little less than a month left in office, was aboard a specially modified C-135, the “Speckled Trout,” that was normally used by the Air Force chief of staff. Shelton was informed of the incident by Colonel Douglas Lute, a rising West Point graduate who served as his executive assistant. When told that a second plane had crashed into the south tower (seventeen minutes after the first crash), Shelton concluded the incident was a terrorist attack and ordered his C-135 to return to the United States. Shelton’s absence made Vice Chairman Richard Myers the acting JCS chairman. “Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be his to make, in conjunction with Secretary Rumsfeld and the president,” Shelton remembers.<sup>14</sup> Myers was on Capitol Hill, headed into a meeting with Georgia senator Max Cleland, when the first plane hit. He saw a report of the incident on a television outside of Cleland’s office. Myers’s first thought was that the incident was an accident. “I remember the day being beautiful,” he later recounted. “I said, ‘How could a pilot be that stupid, to hit a tower? I mean, what’—but then you think, ‘Well, whatever.’” Myers was in Cleland’s office when the second plane hit, and immediately notified his staff to assemble the JCS’s crisis activation team (CAT), a half-dozen senior officers who coordinate military emergency responses. He then headed back to the Pentagon. In Colorado Springs, General Ralph Eberhart was at NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base when the second jetliner hit. After trying to get in touch with Shelton, Eberhart reached Myers just as he was leaving Cleland’s office. The two agreed that the United States was under attack. Myers’s directive to assemble the JCS’s CAT was followed by similar orders for each of the services. At the Pentagon, Major General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s director of operations, readiness, and mobilization, heard about the New York attack from Major General Julian Burns, the deputy chief for operations of the US Army Forces Command. “Have you seen what’s happened in New York?” Burns asked. Chiarelli looked up at a muted television, which showed smoke pouring from the north tower, and called Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Stramara, his operations chief. “It’s time to activate the CAT,” he said. “Get it set up.”<sup>15</sup> The incident must have struck Chiarelli as a dark irony. Just the month before, he’d told his staff that they would be doing an exercise using the CAT during the week of September 11. It had been ten years since the CAT was used, and Chiarelli wanted to make sure everyone knew what to do. At the center of the exercise, he decided, would be an incident featuring an aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center. Now Chiarelli was faced with the same scenario. Chiarelli was floored by the coincidence, but shook it off. Things happen. Within the next minutes, on his orders, Army officers headed to the Army’s command and control center, located in a bunker two floors beneath a Pentagon parking lot. Before heading there himself, Chiarelli turned to Stramara: “If there are other aircraft up there that have been hijacked,” he said, “or if there are other aircraft getting ready to do this, this building has got to be a target. Who has responsibility for this building?” Stramara didn’t know: “I will check,” he said.<sup>16</sup> Donald Rumsfeld was at the Pentagon in the midst of a breakfast meeting with members of Congress to discuss the QDR when Flight 11 flew into the north tower. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was present, as was Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, Navy vice admiral Edmund Giambastiani

Jr. The breakfast was breaking up when Rumsfeld was handed a note about what had happened in New York, but, like Myers, he assumed the incident was an accident and so headed to his office. It was while he was there that the Pentagon was hit by American Airlines Flight 77. The aircraft plowed into the first floor of the western side of the Pentagon, killing 189 people, including 125 in the building. A fourth aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in Pennsylvania twenty minutes after the Pentagon attack, at 9:57 a.m. Seated in his office, Rumsfeld headed outside to assess the damage and could be seen there, in later photographs, helping to carry a stretcher of a wounded victim. By the time of the Pennsylvania crash, General Eberhart had told Myers that he was grounding all commercial aviation, and directing all fighter aircraft in the United States to “battle stations, fully armed.” At the White House, reports that a fourth aircraft was headed to Washington (this was the United Airlines flight that crashed in Pennsylvania) spurred Vice President Cheney’s security detail to evacuate him to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, which is below the East Wing of the White House. Cheney had already talked with George Bush, who was in a classroom at an elementary school in Florida when he’d heard about the first attack. Bush’s chief of staff, Andy Card, then told him about the second plane by whispering in his ear. “A second plane has hit the second tower,” he said. “America is under attack.” Bush made a split-second decision “not to jump up immediately and leave the classroom. I didn’t want to rattle the kids. I wanted to project a sense of calm.” Later, Bush said that his first reaction was “anger.” Who the hell would do this to America? he wondered.<sup>17</sup> While reporters would pore over the timeline of 9/11 in the years ahead, hoping to find some clue of panic among the nation’s leaders, the evidence suggests the opposite—a sense among senior military officers, at least, that they should be careful not to overreact. In Colorado, Ralph Eberhart ordered a limited version of the Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids system, which would clear all commercial airspace above the United States, while maintaining ground navigation stations to ensure that flights still in the air could land. At the Pentagon, meanwhile, Richard Myers dragged his feet when Donald Rumsfeld recommended raising the defense readiness condition to level three—with defense condition one signifying imminent war. Myers recommended that the order be confirmed by the White House, which slowed the process. Myers later told an aide that while raising the alert level “was appropriate,” it would do little to protect the nation from the kinds of attacks it had suffered that morning.<sup>18</sup> All three senior military officers—Shelton (whose aircraft was not allowed into US airspace until that afternoon), Myers, and Eberhart—concluded that while what had happened in New York, at the Pentagon, and at a crash site in Pennsylvania was an act of war, it did not constitute an existential threat to the US homeland. There was no reason to “spin up the missiles” (prepare for war, in Pentagon parlance). For both Hugh Shelton and Richard Myers, there was never much doubt about the attacker’s identity. Arriving at the Pentagon late that afternoon (his flight had taken him directly over the smoking remains of the World Trade Center), Hugh Shelton assembled his senior Joint Staff officers to hear what they’d learned, then headed to the White House. But later that night, he returned to the Pentagon to quiz them. A bevy of officers ran through the leading suspects as he shook his head—no, no, and no—until they got to al-Qaeda. Somewhere in Afghanistan, he knew, Osama bin Laden had planned the attack, then recruited and trained the attackers. Shelton was checking all the boxes, but the briefing was essential, he recalled, “in the unlikely event that someone other than al-Qaeda was responsible.”<sup>19</sup>

13 mrt. 2022

## **CHAPTER NINE Mike Mullen: The Navy’s George Marshall**

---

### **Pagina 250 | Markeren (Geel)**

Pressured by Great Britain and France, and with Power, Rice, and Clinton in favor of stopping a slaughter,

## **Pagina 250 | Markeren, vervolg**

Obama instructed Rice to seek a UN resolution backing the US position. Two days later, UN resolution 1973 gave the United States and NATO a free hand in Libya, and on March 19, 120 US cruise missiles slammed into Qaddafi's air defense systems. At the end of March, the US ceded control of the operation to NATO, and Odyssey Dawn became Operation Unified Protector. The US, the administration said, was not taking the lead in Libya—it was “leading from behind.”<sup>50</sup>

13 mrt. 2022

## **Pagina 250 | Markeren (Geel)**

But Odyssey Dawn was not a success. After Qaddafi was hunted down and then ignominiously executed the next October, Libya descended into chaos, with Obama admitting the United States “had not adequately planned for the day after.” In private, he called Libya a “shit show.” Odyssey Dawn also had a pernicious impact on the military, which stood behind Mullen in opposing the intervention. Senior military officers were embittered by Clinton's about-face on intervention, by Susan Rice's micromanagement of the conflict, and by Samantha Power's advocacy for “R2P,” the US “responsibility to protect” vulnerable populations. For senior officers, Libya was a replay of Bosnia, a dark repeat of Madeleine Albright's assertive multilateralism. In military shorthand, Clinton, Rice, and Power were “cruise missile liberals,” or worse: “the coven.” Retired Army colonel Andrew Bacevich, a professor at Boston University (and perhaps the most respected commenter on America's Middle East interventions), called them “the three harpies”; from good intentions, he said, they'd created a “Somalia on the Mediterranean.”<sup>51</sup> But, unlike previous controversial interventions (and especially the one in Iraq), at least the military leadership had taken a more careful view and stood its ground in opposition to Clinton, Rice, and Power. And while Mullen had lost the debate, he'd stubbornly reflected the military's views. The president and his aides might not have been able to answer the question “and then what,” but Mullen and the military had—as Libya, they predicted, would end up in chaos.

13 mrt. 2022